Randomised clinical trials provide the most valid means of establishing the efficacy of clinical therapeutics. Ethical standards dictate that patients and clinicians should not consent to randomisation unless there is uncertainty about whether any of the treatment options is superior to the others ("equipoise"). However, true equipoise is rarely present; most randomised trials, therefore, present challenging ethical dilemmas. Minimising the tension between science and ethics is an obligation of investigators and clinicians. This article briefly reviews several techniques for addressing this issue and suggests that unbalanced randomisation, a technique rarely employed in current clinical trial practice, may be usefulfor enhancing the ethical design of human experimentation.
In theory, a randomised clinical trial (RCT) of a new intervention should be initiated only if there is uncertainty as to whether any of the alternative treatments under study is superior.`3 Under traditional ethical paradigms, if clinicians have any preference for one of the experimental options, they are obliged to inform patients of their preferred approach and reject randomisation. 4 In reality, such true indifference, or "equipoise," is unusual.4 5 Presumably, investigators would not initiate a clinical trial if they didn't have some reason to believe that the new intervention had advantages over the current standard of care. Even if the probable outcome were quite uncertain, clinicians and patients might still perceive an advantage to using "cutting edge" therapy for the emotional benefits alone.3 Furthermore, confirmatory trials (those intended to validate the results of previous experiments) cannot begin with an assumption of equipoise, since prior information about efficacy and safety exists.
When clinicians cannot sincerely claim a state of indifference, serious problems may develop.
Previous clinical trials have suffered when clinicians failed to enrol all eligible patients, introducing problems of generalisability and reduced statistical power. In one example of inadequate subject recruitment, clinicians identified problems with claiming true uncertainty as an important reason for refusing to enrol many eligible subjects.6 Such situations also raise ethical concerns, since subjects are exposed to untested interventions with a diminished chance of yielding meaningful information. Zelen has proposed a set of "randomised consent" designs in which subjects are randomised prior to being asked to enrol in a trial.7 These designs may substantially aid recruitment in difficult situations,89 but carry their own set of methodologic and ethical concerns.8 10 11 Ifwe are to continue performing clinical trials in the absence of true equipoise, how can we reconcile the ethical mandate and the practical reality? This article presents a brief overview of several proposals for addressing the dilemma and offers an appeal for more widespread application of a little-used randomisation variant for this purpose. Throughout this discussion, the type of clinical trial addressed is the "parallel-comparison-oftreatment" design, the most common type of clinical trial. 12 
Methodologic approaches
While philosophical approaches have sought to justify the concept of randomisation, methodologic approaches take a different perspective: given that one treatment arm of a clinical trial may prove inferior, the methodologic techniques attempt to minimise the number of subjects who ultimately receive the inferior therapy. These techniques, employed singly or in combination, are not "solutions" to the ethical problem; their object is to reduce the tension, not eliminate it. Experimentation with people will always be difficult and uncomfortable; these techniques help to diminish the problems but cannot resolve them entirely. To contend with the problem of inflating the experimentwise type I error (ie, the probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis of "no effect" when it is true), statisticians have developed a set of techniques, called group sequential designs, to permit interim analyses while constraining the overall probability of a type I error. ' In usual clinical practice, patients choose whether to receive a given therapy. In the research context, however, patients choose whether to receive a probability of receiving a given therapy. Unlike the truly dichotomous decisions of clinical practice, the clinical trial offers only a chance of receiving a therapy and there is no a priori reason why that chance must be exactly 50%.
Balanced randomisation implies a state of true equipoise. Suppose an individual has a very slight preference for one of the treatment alternatives. In this case, balanced randomisation is unlikely to cause much uneasiness. As the preference for one alternative grows, however, increasing discomfort will probably develop to the point where enrolling in the trial becomes untenable. Thus, there is a continuous, not simply a dichotomous, departure from equipoise. The degree of uncertainty about the superiority of one option (and, therefore, the degree of deviation from equipoise) will vary according to several factors: the likelihood of success with the new intervention, the probable magnitude of superiority of the new intervention, the known efficacy of the current standard treatment, the severity of the particular disease process, and the risk tolerance of the potential subjects. For example, there would likely be little discomfort regardless of the study design for illnesses that involve little mortality or long-term morbidity risk (for example, a clinical trial of therapies for the common cold). For more serious conditions, however, potential subjects may have strong preferences for a treatment option, particularly in view of the other aspects noted above.
To the degree that informed individuals generally have preferences or concerns about one treatment option, adjusting the randomisation ratio to reflect those attitudes should result in a more ethically acceptable trial. If the likelihood of success with the new intervention is great and subjects would generally prefer receiving this intervention, randomising a greater proportion of subjects to it would be desirable. This tendency, however, should be mitigated by the known efficacy of the control therapy: if standard treatment is known to be highly effective, one should be cautious about randomising even half the subjects to any untested intervention, particularly for diseases with great morbidity and mortality.
In mathematical terms, we wish to maximise the expected utility of the experiment, based on the prior probabilities of success with each therapy and the estimated utilities of the possible outcomes. In more concrete terms, we should approach the clinical trial just as the investor approaches an investment. In each case, the goal is to maximise benefit under conditions of uncertainty. Unlike the typical clinical trial, however, a wise investor does not arbitrarily place equal portions of money into alternative investments with differing risk and yields; rather, one would generally "hedge one's bets" and allocate money according to realistic estimates of success and the implications of suffering a loss.
Balanced randomisation is generally regarded as the preferred allocation scheme in clinical trials since it optimises statistical power. " Unbalanced randomisation schemes are rarely employed in randomised trials, though there may be surprisingly little loss of power with even moderate imbalances. Pocock has shown that, in many cases, there is only a minor loss of power using randomisation ratios as unbalanced as 3:1 (that is, randomising three times as many subjects to one arm as the other), though power declines rapidly with ratios greater than this.29 30 Figure 1 shows power curves for a hypothetical clinical trial. The top graph shows the decrease in power associated with different allocation ratios, assuming a constant number of subjects; the bottom graph shows the total number and distribution of subjects required under different allocation ratios, assuming a constant statistical power. In general, the loss of power or the increase in the total number of required subjects is small with ratios less than 2:1, and only slightly more with ratios as large as 3 Proportion in experimental group Figure 1 : Sample size and power curves for a hypothetical clinical trial with a dichotomous outcome. Both graphs assume a two-sided a level of 0. 05, a 50% probability of success in the experimental group and 30% in the control group. In Figure 1A , a constant sample size of 248 is assumed; the curve depicts the reduction in power associated with increasing proportion of subjects allocated to the experimental group (ie, increasing imbalance in subject allocation from 1:1 [50% in the experimental group] to 9:1 [90% in the experimental group]). In Figure IB , a constant power of 0.9 (beta = 0. 1) is assumed; the curves represent the sample sizes of the experimental group (long dashes), control group (short dashes), and both combined (solid line), associated with an increasing proportion of subjects allocated to the experimental group. each trial should be performed before implementing any experimental design.
Whose point of view?
A critical question arises: from whose perspective should the allocation decision be made? Most discussions of equipoise focus on clinicians and investigators, since these individuals have the sophistication to make truly informed judgments about the biomedical issues. However, since it is ultimately the subjects who must bear the risks of the experiment, opportunities for involving participants in the design of the study must be aggressively explored.2 31 Establishing an allocation ratio provides such an opportunity. Qualitative decisions such as how to weight increased efficacy against increased side effects can only be made realistically by those who will experience the trade-off. A working partnership between potential subjects and investigators is needed to define the optimum solution; this is, admittedly, not typical in current research practice.
Input from those who understand the scientific issues is essential, however, as previous work with surrogate patients has shown. MacKillop et al surveyed expert physicians about their willingness to participate in specific clinical trials and gave this information to healthy surrogate "patients". The investigators found that the willingness of the surrogate patients to enter a clinical trial of chemotherapy (though, interestingly, not of surgery) for lung cancer was heavily influenced by the opinions of the physician experts.32 It should be noted that, to further the interests of subjects, "expert" opinion must be realistic, unfettered, and unbiased; explicit acknowledgment of the degree of prior uncertainty is essential. When investigators have unrealistic expectations of a new and untested intervention, or when elements of trial design are hindered by imprudent regulatory mandates, the goal of designing more participantoriented trials may be seriously compromised.
Clearly, only truly informed individuals can make independent decisions; in general, a partnership among all relevant parties is required. For some conditions, this can be particularly difficult. Research with vulnerable populations (for example, children and patients with dementia or severe psychiatric illness) requires special care, especially when incorporating the values and preferences of potential subjects.33 In these situations, investigators have a singular duty to ensure that the interests of subjects are respected.3"36 Methods that may be employed to help protect these subjects include close cooperation with guardians, special oversight from institutional review boards, and involvement of advocacy groups for patients with the particular illnesses.
Serious misunderstandings of the biomedical issues on the part of subjects may lead to poor choices; similarly, inadequate appreciation of the personal issues on the part of investigators may produce inappropriate decisions. When clinicians, investigators and potential subjects all have opportunities to share in the design of clinical experiments, research ethics may be greatly enhanced.
Choosing an allocation ratio
The final challenge, then, is to identify a method for choosing the allocation ratio that best reflects the state of clinical uncertainty and with which potential subjects (and their health care providers) would feel comfortable. Ideally, the procedure should force individuals explicitly to acknowledge the degree of uncertainty and to consider the factors noted above (the probability and magnitude of superiority of the new intervention, the efficacy of standard care, and the severity of the illness under study). In the case of confirmatory trials, one could conceive of this technique as a form of adaptive randomisation using previous trials, rather than patients, as the unit of analysis: as more trials suggest the superiority of one treatment arm, a greater proportion of subjects could be assigned to that arm in subsequent trials. Techniques such as cumulative meta-analysis37 could be modified for this situation, by providing an evolving assessment of the relative benefits of alternative treatments.
Other possibilities include the use of consensusdevelopment techniques (such as the Delphi method38) or surveying clinicians and identifying the proportions who prefer one of the possible treatment options. Modifications of preferenceelicitation techniques commonly used in decision analysis may also prove useful. The basic reference gamble, for example, could be adapted to help quantify the utilities and trade-offs perceived by potential subjects.39 Clearly, any procedure would require empirical evaluation before it could be advocated for general use.
Since individuals' values and preferences vary, it is unlikely that any single allocation ratio would be universally accepted as optimum. While variation in choice of an allocation ratio is expected, investigators should consider the nature of this variability carefully, rather than dismiss the process entirely. For example, if the problem is that some potential participants would prefer a very high likelihood of receiving the new intervention (for example, a 3:1 allocation ratio), while others would prefer a more modest imbalance (for example, a 2:1 ratio), certainly adopting a 2:1 randomisation scheme would be more generally preferable to the almost universal convention of balanced randomisation. To the extent that subjects enter a clinical trial in order to gain access to new therapeutics, acknowledging this desire in setting an allocation ratio shows greater respect for their preferences. Sonie 49 50 Though the ethical problems of experimenting on people can never be entirely resolved, there are several techniques that may help to minimise the dilemmas. In particular, unbalanced randomisation may enhance the ethical construct and acceptability of clinical trials, and the loss of statistical power with even a moderate imbalance may be minor. As researchers, clinicians, and patients strive to learn the best means of curing disease and reducing disability, creative approaches will be needed to lessen the tension between medical needs and ethical mandates.
New website for Linacre Centre
The Linacre Centre for Health Care Ethics, the only full contents and extensive reviews, the website also Catholic bioethics centre in the UK and Ireland, has contains papers on topical issues in medical ethics such recently launched its new website. As well as infor-as human cloning, euthanasia and advance directives. mation about the centre and its publications, including
The site address is: www.linacre.org.
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